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I. FIVE DIMENSIONS
The notice for this symposium provided that “[f]irst, we do
not have the legal, institutional, or physical infrastructure to
transition to cleaner energy sources.”1 There is a twist to this:
First, we do have a multidimensional state legal infrastructure
undertaking this, but it is being challenged as unconstitutional
or otherwise illegal. We have not always had legally strategic
implementation of energy infrastructure. This Article describes
which initiatives states have adopted for sustainable energy
promotion and what legal trip-wires they are encountering.
Second, the conference design also declares that “we do not
have effective governance strategies for complex, multi-level
problems that predominate at the intersection of
environmental and energy law.”2 At this intersection is electric
power. More than one-third of CO2 emissions are attributable
to the electric power sector.3 Ninety-eight percent of
anthropogenic CO2 emissions are from combustion of fossil
fuels.4 Fossil fuel generation results in 64% of total humanmade atmospheric CO2,5 and the International Energy Agency
forecasts that by 2030, world demand for energy will grow by
60%,6 with fossil fuel sources supplying 82% of the total7 and
noncarbon renewable energy sources supplying only 6%.8 At
current rates of energy development, energy-related CO2

1. See Conference Themes: Legal & Policy Pathways for Energy
Innovation, U. MINN., CONSORTIUM ON L. & VALUES HEALTH, ENV’T & LIFE
SCI., http://consortium.umn.edu/lecturesconferences/conferences/lppei/themes/
home.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Conference Themes].
2. Id.
3. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, EMISSION OF
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2005, at 16 (2006), available at
ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/oiaf/1605/cdrom/pdf/ggrpt/057305.pdf.
4. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE
UNITED STATES 1998, at 13 (1999), available at http://www.eia.gov/
environment/archive/057398.pdf.
5. See Frequently Asked Global Change Questions, CARBON DIOXIDE
INFO. ANALYSIS CENTER, http://cdiac.ornl.gov/faq.html (last visited Oct. 25,
2013).
6. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2004, at 57
(2004).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 34.
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emissions in 2050 would be 250% of their current levels under
the existent pattern.9
There is a substantial need for sustainable electric power
development. It is the key infrastructure to determine the
future carbon footprint. And the current sustainable energy
policy of the United States is largely implemented at the state,
rather than federal, level of government. Several of these state
policies are confronting Supremacy and dormant Commerce
Clause constitutional challenges. This Article charts the nature
of these challenges and their legal and policy significance.
Third, the conference design notes: “Many of our most
daunting environmental and energy challenges cross
jurisdictional boundaries, involve multiple levels of governance
(e.g., local, state, regional, national, international), or both.
Natural systems do not respect the artificial territorial and
jurisdictional boundaries of governments, whether at the local,
state, or national levels . . . .”10 The constitutional doctrines
above do not respect state boundaries, prevent states from
discriminating in their regulation based on the place of origin
of electric power and commerce, and constrain state regulation
of the expanding interstate wholesale power market.
Finally, the symposium design notes that “[w]ith no single
institution well-positioned to solve the problem, it may simply
fall between the cracks; or it may be addressed partially and
inadequately by one or more well-intentioned institutional
actors . . . .”11 The legal institutional “cracks” are significant—
and this symposium Article works in the Fifth Dimension.
Some will remember that the Fifth Dimension was a music
group, famous for hit songs such as Aquarius/Let the Sunshine
In.12 I suppose that this song about letting the sunshine in

9. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES:
SCENARIOS AND STRATEGIES TO 2050, at 25 (2006), available at
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/6106201e.pdf?expires=
1384129338&id=id&accname=ocid195223&checksum=2FB3960ABB42D0D37
E970E8D23FA2806 (“In the Baseline Scenario for this study, CO2 emissions
will be almost two and a half times the current level by 2050.”).
10. Conference Themes, supra note 1.
11. Id.
12. Their hits include Aquarius/Let the Sunshine In and Wedding Bell
Blues, on THE AGE OF AQUARIUS (Soul City Records 1969); (Last Night) I
Didn’t Get to Sleep at All, on INDIVIDUALLY & COLLECTIVELY (Bell Records
1972); The Magic Garden, on THE MAGIC GARDEN (Soul City Records 1967);
One Less Bell to Answer, on PORTRAIT (Bell Records 1970); Stoned Soul Picnic,
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could be an appropriate embarkation point for a discussion that
includes renewable power. Nonetheless, for my purposes here,
the Five Dimensions are:
 The First Dimension: Basic state governance powers on
power; the Supremacy Clause affecting feed-in tariffs
and net metering;
 The Second Dimension: Do power unto others . . . ; The
dormant Commerce Clause applied to renewable
portfolio standards and state benefit charges;
 The Third Dimension: The First and Second Dimensions
combined on energy;
 The Fourth Dimension: State power regarding
transmission rights of first refusal; and
 The Fifth Dimension: Beyond power to climate issues.
The next sections of this Article take us into the Five
Dimensions of U.S. federal and state sustainable energy policy
and through the legal cracks in its infrastructure and
governance. States have sculpted sustainable energy policy
around five dimensions of legal and policy initiatives:
 Net metering: In 86% of states;13
 Renewable portfolio standards: In 58% of states;14
 Renewable system benefit charges: In 30% of states;15
 Carbon and greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation: In 24% of
states;16
 Feed-in tariffs: In 14% of states.17

on STONED SOUL PICNIC (Soul City Records 1968); Up, Up and Away, on UP,
UP AND AWAY (Soul City Records 1967). Aquarius/Let the Sunshine In was
featured in the movie FORREST GUMP (Paramount Pictures 1994) and was
ranked at #57 on Billboard’s “Greatest Songs of All Time” and at #33 on the
2004 AFI’s “100 Years of Songs.”
13. Net Metering, DATABASE ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES &
EFFICIENCY,
http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/net_
metering_map.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
14. Renewable Portfolio Standards, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/agstar/tools/funding/renewable.html (last updated Sept.
27, 2012).
15. Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Public
Benefits Funds for Renewables, PowerPoint Presentation 1 (2013) [hereinafter
Public Benefit Funds], available at http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/
summarymaps/PBF_Map.pptx.
16. Energy Regulation in the States: A Wake-up Call, INST. FOR ENERGY
RES., 6, http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/pdf/statereport.pdf (last
visited Oct. 23, 2013).
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Through each of the sustainable policies above, higher
charges are levied in retail utility bills, which have been cause
for ongoing litigation. One of these five state initiatives was
stricken at the trial level as unconstitutional,18 reversed by a
split panel on appeal and now subject to a request for rehearing
en banc.19 Others were stated to be unconstitutional in the
method that some states have implemented them,20 and a
recent federal adjudicatory order casts legal uncertainty on
another of these five initiatives.21 Next, into the First
Dimension.
II. THE FIRST DIMENSION: HARD, ‘BRIGHT’ LINES FOR
BASIC GOVERNANCE POWERS ON POWER
A. FEED-IN TARIFFS
Feed-in tariffs (FiTs) are regulatory requirements imposed
by some states on their regulated utilities to purchase certain
designated types of independent power generation on a
wholesale basis, typically from renewable resources or
combined heat and power (CHP) units, at prices well in excess
of the market value of wholesale power.22 The regulated
utilities are directed by law and regulation to “buy high” on
wholesale in terms of other electric power available in the
market.23
17. Feed-In Tariffs and Similar Programs, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/provider_programs.cfm (last updated
June 4, 2013).
18. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071,
1099 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
19. Rocky Mountanin Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2013).
20. Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d
764 (7th Cir. 2013); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Schuette v. FERC, No. 13443 (Oct. 7, 2013); see also Ann Carlson, Court Casts Doubt on
Constitutionality of Michigan’s Renewable Portfolio Standard, Upholds Cost
Sharing for Transmission Lines, LEGALPLANET (June 11, 2013), http://legalplanet.org/2013/06/11/court-strikes-down-michigans-renewable-portfoliostandard-as-unconstitutional-upholds-cost-sharing-for-transmission-lines.
21. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047, ¶¶ 61,337–61,338
(2010).
22. See NAT’L RURAL ELECTRIC COOP. ASS’N, FEED-IN TARIFFS 1 (2013),
available at http://www.nreca.coop/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/FeedInTariffs_
WhitePaper.pdf.
23. See id. at 1–2. Electric power in the Northeast has been available at
an average price during the past years of $0.05/kilowatt hour (kWh) or less.
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Sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA)24
empower the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
exclusively to regulate rates for the interstate and wholesale
sale and transmission of electricity.25 The U.S. Supreme Court
held that Congress meant to draw a “bright line,” easily
ascertained and not requiring case-by-case analysis, between
state and federal jurisdiction.26 When a transaction is subject
to exclusive FERC jurisdiction and regulation, state regulation
is preempted as a matter of federal law and the U.S.
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, according to a long-standing
and consistent line of rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court.27 The
FERC has “exclusive authority to regulate the transmission
and sale at wholesale of electric energy in interstate
commerce . . . .”28 If states impose a rate in excess of avoided
cost (the wholesale value of power in the market) by either “law

See Conway Irwin, Phasing Out the PTC as Wind Nears Grid Parity,
BREAKING ENERGY (Oct. 16, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://breakingenergy.com/
2013/10/16/phasing-out-the-ptc-as-wind-nears-grid-parity/. The Vermont feedin tariffs for power of this value were set for wind of less than 15 kW at
$0.20/kWh, for wind more than 15 kW at $0.125/kWh, and for solar generation
at $0.30/kWh. LOLA INFANTE ET AL., EDISON ELEC. INST., FEED-IN TARIFFS IN
EUROPE
AND
THE
UNITED
STATES
39
(2009),
available
at
http://www3.eei.org/meetings/Meeting%20Documents/2010-03-15-rrac-FITsbackground-paper.pdf.
24. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d–824e (2012).
25. See Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty. Wash. v. FERC, 471
F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 547 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2008).
26. Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16
(1964).
27. See Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 47
(2003); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 374
(1988); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 963–66
(1986); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 341 U.S. 246,
251 (1951). The Supreme Court overturned an order of the New Hampshire
Public Utilities Commission that restrained within the state, for the financial
advantage of in-state ratepayers, low-cost hydroelectric energy produced
within the state. New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 344
(1982). It held this to be an impermissible violation of Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 3 of the dormant Commerce Clause and the FPA: “Our cases
consistently
have
held
that
the
Commerce
Clause
of
the
Constitution . . . precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given
a preferred right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources
located within its borders or to the products derived therefrom.” Id. at 338.
28. New Eng. Power Co., 455 U.S. at 340.
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or policy,” the “contracts will be considered to be void ab
initio.”29
Several states moved to decouple the amount of revenue
earned by a regulated utility from lock-step with the amount of
power it can produce and sell.30 Such retail reward is entirely
within state authority. Decoupling of electric utility rates, as of
2013, had been approved in some form in fourteen states.31
California, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and
Massachusetts are the five states leading decoupling.32 These
29. Conn. Light & Power Co., 70 FERC ¶ 61,012, ¶¶ 61,029–61,030
(1995). For a case where states did not have authority to lower wholesale
renewable power sale rates, see Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n v. Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n, 36 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 1994); S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 FERC
¶ 61,215, ¶¶ 61,677–61,679 (1995).
30. See, e.g., INNOVATION ELEC. EFFICIENCY, STATE ELECTRIC
EFFICIENCY
REGULATORY
FRAMEWORKS
1
(2013),
available
at
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iee/Documents/IEE_StateRegulatoryFrame_
0713.pdf. The names used for decoupling vary, including “Billing Determinant
Adjustment,” “Volume Balancing Adjustment,” and “Bill Stabilization Rider.”
See Pamela G. Lesh & Dylan Sullivan, Rate Impacts and Key Design Elements
of Gas and Electric Utility Decoupling: A Comprehensive View, NATURAL RES.
DEF. COUNCIL, http://aceee.org/files/pdf/conferences/eer/2009/1D_Sullivan
_Lesh.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
31. See INNOVATION ELEC. EFFICIENCY, supra note 30, at 5. Most of these
states had adopted lost revenue recovery provisions to make regulated utilities
“whole” for pursuing lower sales volume in favor of greater energy efficiency.
In 2007, California implemented a risk-reward incentive mechanism (RRIM)
in conjunction with its four largest utilities whereby utilities receive “rewards”
if they meet specific energy efficiency goals. TOM ROBERTS, AM. COUNCIL FOR
AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., CALIFORNIA’S SHAREHOLDER INCENTIVE
MECHANISM: A RATEPAYER PERSPECTIVE 4-76 (2009), available at
http://aceee.org/files/proceedings/2009/data/papers/4_78.pdf. Under the RRIM,
utilities are allowed to recover a percentage of the total net savings (savings
minus costs) from energy efficiency if they achieved a minimum of 85% of the
program goals. Id. at 4-80. In this program, utilities were also subject to a
penalty if performance fell below 65% of goals. Id. Performance between 65%
and 85% resulted in no penalties and no rewards. Id. The Massachusetts
Department of Public Utilities issued an order that establishes a new base
rate adjustment mechanism that decouples utility companies’ revenues from
company electricity sales. Investigation by the Department of Public Utilities
on its own Motion into Rate Structures That Will Promote Efficient
Deployment of Demand Resources, Order No. 07-50-A, at 86–88 (Mass. D.P.U.
July 16, 2008), available at http://www.env.state.ma.us/DPU_FileRoom/
frmDocketListSP.aspx (search “Docket Number” for “07-50,” then open
“Order” dated “July 16, 2008”).
32. See Cathy Cash, Decoupling Mandate Keeps the Pot Stirred as
Congress Advances Stimulus Package, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Feb. 2, 2009, at 3
(noting that “[a]ccording to NRDC”, these five states “have adopted decoupling
revenue mechanisms for both gas and electric utilities” while “[t]hirty-seven
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are the states that led electric utility restructuring and retail
deregulation in the late 1990s,33 that led the development of
renewable portfolio standards and renewable system benefit
charges also in the late 1990s,34 and led state carbon regulation
in 2009.35
The Supreme Court in 1986, and again in 1988, 2003, and
2008, reaffirmed and enforced exclusive federal jurisdiction
pursuant to the Filed Rate Doctrine when states attempted to
assert jurisdiction inconsistent with the FERC’s exclusive
authority over wholesale rate and term determinations.36
California lost its case in 2010 when attempting to defend its
state feed-in tariffs for renewable power.37 A challenge by
regional generators of power in the Mid-Atlantic states against
New Jersey’s in-state energy facility location preferences for
new power generation resulted in changes in the FERCapproved regional PJM Independent System Operator
procedures, and thereafter, now face pending constitutional
challenges in federal court.38
An increasing majority of U.S. power now proceeds
through a wholesale power sale prior to its ultimate retail

states have taken no steps toward electric decoupling and [thirty-three] have
not adopted decoupling for gas”).
33. See STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A GUIDE TO ELECTRIC MARKET
DEREGULATION 135–57 (2000) [hereinafter THE NEW RULES] (describing
deregulation of electricity retail markets, focusing on deregulation policy in
California and Massachusetts); 2 STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT
POWER: DEVELOPMENT/COGENERATION/UTILITY REGULATION §§ 10:6–10:12
(30th ed. 2013) [hereinafter 2 INDEPENDENT POWER].
34. See Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and
States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 507, 645–71 (2004).
35. See Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: Potential Constitutional
Impediments to the Regulation of Global Warming, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 835, 843,
845–46 (2008).
36. See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 963
(1986) (holding that the Filed Rate Doctrine limitations also apply “to
decisions of state courts”); see also Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub.
Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 531 (2008); Entergy La.,
Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 47 (2003); Miss. Power & Light Co.
v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 372 (1988).
37. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047, ¶¶ 61,337–61,338
(2010).
38. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 135 FERC ¶ 61,022, ¶¶ 61,091,
61,093, order clarified on reh’g by 137 FERC ¶ 61,145 (2011).
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disposition,39 thereby fundamentally altering the legal analysis
of what is and is not now constitutional for a state, as opposed
to the federal government, to regulate.40 A large number of
independent renewable power generators now sell their power
wholesale to redistributing utilities and others that thereafter
resell that power to retail customers.41 A few states have tried
to impose FiTs on utilities and their ratepayers for favored
renewable power sales at wholesale to the utilities.42 There is a
“bright line” legally prohibiting state regulation.43
B. NET METERING
Net metering is the most utilized state incentive for
renewable power nationwide, in place in more than 85% of U.S.
states.44 Net metering is an accounting concept typically
applied to renewable sources of distributed power selfgenerated on the utility customer’s side of the retail utility
meter.45 Each of the forty-three state net metering programs is
distinct.46 There are differences as to allowable sizes of units,
39. See ELEC. ENERGY MKT. COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR
ELECTRIC ENERGY 10 (2006), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fedsta/ene-pol-act/epact-final-rpt.pdf (“In the 1970s, vertically integrated utility
companies (investor-owned, municipal, or cooperative) controlled over 95
percent of the electric generation in the United States . . . . [B]y 2004 electric
utilities owned less than 60 percent of electric generating capacity.
Increasingly, decisions affecting retail customers and electricity rates are split
among federal, state, and new private, regional entities.”).
40. 1 STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER:
DEVELOPMENT/COGENERATION/UTILITY REGULATION §§ 5:26–5:28 (30th ed.
2013) [hereinafter 1 INDEPENDENT POWER]; see STEVEN FERREY,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 460–61 (1997)
[hereinafter FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW].
41. See FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 40, at 461.
42. See JULIE TAYLOR, NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM’RS,
FEED-IN TARIFFS (FIT): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS FOR STATE UTILITY
COMMISSIONS 8–9 (2010), available at http://www.naruc.org/Publications/
NARUC%20Feed%20in%20Tariff%20FAQ.pdf.
43. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
44. See Net Metering, supra note 13.
45. See Generating Your Own Electricity: Net Metering, PUB. UTIL.
COMM’N OHIO, http://www.puco.ohio.gov/puco/index.cfm/consumerinformation/
consumer-topics/generating-your-own-electricity-net-metering (last visited
Oct. 26, 2013).
46. See Net Metering, supra note 13; Net Metering, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS.
ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/policy/distributed-solar/net-metering (last visited
Oct. 26, 2013).
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the vintage and longevity of credits, whether credits can be
cashed out, eligible classes of customers, and eligible
technologies.47
When the customer purchases and uses electricity from the
distribution company, the meter runs forward; when more
electricity is produced from the facility than is consumed by the
customer, the excess is sent to the electricity grid, running the
meter in reverse direction and reversing the net accounting of
power flow.48 By turning the meter backwards, since only a
single rate applies to a single meter, net metering effectively
compensates the generator at the full retail rate (which
includes approximately two-thirds of the retail bill that is
attributable to transmission, distribution, and taxes49) for
transferring just the wholesale energy commodity—the power
itself.50 Accounting at the retail rate multiplies by several-fold
the effective value or revenue earned from the wholesale power
transaction of supplying wholesale power to the utility.51
In 2001, the FERC held that state net metering decisions
were not preempted by federal law.52 In its order, the FERC

47. See, e.g., Net Metering, supra note 13.
48. See Generating Your Own Electricity: Net Metering, supra note 45.
49. See Herman K. Trabish, Arizona’s Biggest Utility Proposes a Cut to
GREENTECHSOLAR
(July
12,
2013),
Net
Metering,
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/arizonas-biggest-utilityproposes-to-a-cut-to-net-metering.
50. See Rick Tempchin, Time to Rethink Metering Rules: Cost and
UTIL.
(May
28,
2013),
Fairness,
INTELLIGENT
http://www.intelligentutility.com/article/13/05/time-rethink-metering-rulescost-and-fairness. As to whether electricity is a “good” or a “service” and how it
should be treated under the law, see THE NEW RULES, supra note 33, at
212–23.
51. See Tempchin, supra note 50. The retail rate of NSTAR power is close
to $0.17/kWh in 2013 for retail residential customers, while the ISO-NE
wholesale rate for that power is less than $0.05/kWh. See, e.g., GREEN
CARLISLE, COMPUTING THE ROI OF A SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEM 2 (2013),
available at http://greencarlisle.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/
Computing-the-ROI-of-a-solar-energy-system.pdf (“Using a current NSTAR
rate of $0.17 per kWh . . . .”). See Hourly Data, ISO NEW ENGLAND, ISONE.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2013), for real-time market data on wholesale
prices.
52. MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 FERC ¶ 61,340, ¶¶ 62,262–62,264
(2001). In March 2001, MidAmerican Energy Company challenged before the
FERC the state of Iowa’s regulations “directing MidAmerican to interconnect
with three Alternate Energy facilities and to offer net billing arrangements to
those facilities.” Id. ¶ 62,261. MidAmerican also requested a declaratory order
that federal law preempted these regulations. Id. MidAmerican asked the
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held that no sale occurs when an individual installs distributed
generation and accounts for its dealings with the utility
through the practice of netting.53 Net metering is not deemed a
retail or wholesale sale of power, and therefore, not subject to
any federal law limitations on the price implications of net
metering.54 In the 2009 Sun Edison case, the FERC determined
that it lacks jurisdiction over the generator if there is no net
sale of power to the utility over the billing period.55 There is no
net sale unless the customer sells back more energy than the
back-up power it consumes within the billing period.56 While
neither the MidAmerican case nor the Sun Edison case
presented such facts of a net power flow to the utility from the
net metered generator, both decisions meticulously and
exhaustively limited this legal finding only to situations where
there was no net flow of power back to the power grid.57
In Rhode Island, there is a challenge to net metering where
the wind generator at the Portsmouth High School is directly
interconnected to the distribution grid rather than first serving
a substantial host load, thus having virtually 100% of net
power flow back to the grid.58
III. THE SECOND DIMENSION: DOING POWER
UNTO OTHERS . . .
A. RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) require electric
utilities and other retail electric providers to include in their
commission to undertake enforcement action against the Iowa Board or to
issue a declaratory order that the final orders of the Iowa Board are
preempted by PURPA. Id.
53. Id. ¶ 62,263.
54. Id.
55. See Sun Edison LLC, 129 FERC ¶ 61,146, ¶61,621 (2009), modified on
reh’g, 131 FERC ¶ 61,213 (2010).
56. Id.
57. See id. ¶¶ 61,620–61,621; MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 FERC,
¶ 62,263.
58. See In re Complaint by Benjamin Riggs relating to Net Metering at
the Portsmouth Wind Generator Facility & Nat’l Grid-Electric, No. D-10-126
(R.I. P.U.C. May 19, 2010), available at http://www.ripuc.org/
eventsactions/docket/D-10-126-Riggs-Portsmouth-Ord20510%2810-1311%29.pdf (arguing that as an independent wholesale project, the wind
generator can be paid no more than the avoided cost afforded to Qualifying
Facilities under PURPA).
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retail sales annually a specified percentage of electricity supply
from specified renewable energy sources in the form of acquired
Renewable Energy Credits (RECs).59 Thirty-eight U.S. states
and the District of Columbia have RPS.60 The current RPS
standards are projected to add 76,750 megawatts of additional
renewable generation by 2025.61
“Most states allow solar, wind, biomass, and landfill gas
resources to qualify in RPS programs; states are less consistent
regarding eligibility for biogas, municipal solid waste (MSW),
geothermal, [all] hydro resources, fuel cells, and ocean tidal
renewable resources to qualify.”62 Renewable power standards
in the state RPS programs have faced recent efforts to repeal or
weaken them in Ohio, Michigan, Kansas, Missouri, North
Carolina, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Maryland, and
Wisconsin.63 These states constitute about one-fourth of the
states that have RPS programs.64 In other states, while
maintaining
the
renewable
percentage
generation
requirements, states have broadened or are considering
broadening the definition of “renewable” energy to include
technologies not normally associated with renewable energy.65
Some states have considered allowing existing, rather than
new, resources to qualify,66 and Oregon, Montana, and Maine

59. See Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/agstar/tools/funding/renewable.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 2013); SREC FAQ, SOLSYSTEMS, http://www.solsystemscompany.com/
our-resources/srec-knowledge-center/srec-faq (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
60. See Rules, Regulations & Policies for Renewable Energy, DATABASE
ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, www.dsireusa.org/
summarytables/rrpre.cfm (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
61. Brad Plumer, The Biggest Fight over Renewable Energy Is Now in the
States, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Mar. 25, 2013, 4:01 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/25/the-biggestfights-over-renewable-energy-are-now-happening-in-the-states.
62. See Steven Ferrey, Follow the Money! Article I and Article VI
Constitutional Barriers to Renewable Energy in the U.S. Future, 17 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 89, 98 (2012).
63. See Herman K. Trabish, Numbers from the War on State Renewables
Standards, GREENTECHMEDIA (Mar. 25, 2013), www.greentechmedia.com/
articles/read/numbers-from-the-war-on-state-renewables-standards.
64. See id.; Rules, Regulations & Policies for Renewable Energy, supra
note 60.
65. See Trabish, supra note 63.
66. Id. (noting Washington’s “effort to allow already built hydroelectric
projects to count toward the state’s 15 percent by 2020 standard”).

2014]

THE FIFTH DIMENSION

481

are considering adding hydropower,67 which many states do not
include. Maryland has considered including natural gas-power
electric generation, while Wisconsin has considered nuclear
power generation.68 West Virginia and Massachusetts allow
coal-derived fuels producing power to qualify.69
About three-quarters of California’s 33% renewable energy
goal legally must come from California pursuant to state
regulation “even though other states can produce renewables at
lower cost due to natural resource advantages (e.g., wind in
Wyoming). Democrats say this is important to foster energy
independence. You never know when Utah will bomb
Wyoming.”70 There are a number of the thirty-eight U.S. states
with RPS that have incorporated credit multipliers and
geographic restrictions or preferences to promote in-state/inregion generation of power, to the exclusion of external power:
 Eight of the thirty-eight RPS states, or 21%, have REC
multipliers for in-state generation: Arizona,71 Colorado,72
Delaware,73 Maine,74 Michigan,75 Missouri,76 Nevada,77
and Washington.78
 Four of the RPS states, or about 10%, including two
states that also provide for a geographically
discriminatory REC multiplier, have either a
requirement or preference for in-state generation:
California,79 Colorado,80 North Carolina,81 and Ohio.82
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. California’s Coming Green-Outs: The Wind and Solar Mandate Means
Future Power Shortages, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2013, 6:46 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873245828045783445004146307
78.html (subscription required).
71. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D) (2009).
72. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(c)(IX) (2013).
73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 356(a)–(c) (Supp. 2012).
74. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, § 3605 (2010).
75. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.1039 (West Supp. 2013).
76. MO. ANN. STAT. § 393.1030(1)(4) (West 2011).
77. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704.7822(1) (LexisNexis 2009).
78. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 194-37-110 (2008).
79. See California Renewables Portfolio Standard, DATABASE ST.
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/
incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=CA25R&re=1&ee=1 (last visited Oct.
7, 2013) (explaining that a maximum of twenty-five percent of RPS compliance
can be achieved through the use of tradable renewable energy credits;
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 Four of the thirty-eight RPS states, or about 10%, give
program preferences to the use of in-state manufactured
products or in-state labor forces: Arizona,83 Delaware,84
Michigan,85 and Montana.86
 Eleven of the thirty-eight RPS states, representing 28%,
have a requirement for in-region, rather than in-state,
geographic location of generation to create RECs,
including one of the states that also has in-state
multipliers and one with an in-state preference:
Illinois,88
Maine,89
Maryland,90
Connecticut,87
91
92
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina93,
Ohio,94 Oregon,95 Pennsylvania,96 and Rhode Island.97
 Eleven of the thirty-eight states, or 28%, have an instate requirement for certain distributed power.
 Four of the thirty-eight states, or about 10%, have a
benefit for an in-state capital component or labor.
 Some states have multiple multipliers and preferences.98
 Only seven of the thirty-eight states have no geographic
preferences in their laws.
The legal issues associated with the regulatory
requirement for regulated utilities to purchase credits from
renewable power generation originating only or principally
therefore, the remainder of the RPS compliance must be attained through instate power sales).
80. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-124(e)(II–III) (West 2011).
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-133.8(b)(2)(e) (LexisNexis 2011).
82. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(B)(3) (West 2011).
83. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(E) (2009).
84. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 356(d)–(e) (Supp. 2012).
85. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.1039(2)(d)–(e) (West Supp. 2013).
86. MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-2005(3)(a) (2013).
87. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-245a(b) (West Supp. 2013).
88. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3855/1-56(b) (West 2011).
89. See 65-407-311 ME. CODE R. § 6(D) (LexisNexis 2011).
90. MD. CODE REGS. 20.61.03(D) (2011).
91. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25A, § 11F(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
92. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-F:6(IV)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
93. Territory Served, PJM INTERCONNECTION, http://www.pjm.com/aboutpjm/who-we-are/territory-served.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
94. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(C)(4)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
95. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 469A.135(1)(a) (West Supp. 2013).
96. See 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1648.4 (West Supp. 2013).
97. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26-4(d) (Supp. 2012).
98. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D)–(E) (2009).
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within the state, and whether that affected power is in
interstate commerce, are discussed below in Part III.C.
B. SYSTEM BENEFITS CHARGES
A system benefits charge (SBC) is a per-kilowatt-hour
power surcharge imposed on all retail electricity consumers
within a state utility’s service territory through monthly utility
bills, which creates an additional state-controlled or
administered energy fund.99 These state renewable trust funds
distribute money to subsidize various renewable energy
resource projects and technologies pursuant to state
legislatures.100 Approximately one-third of U.S. states have
enacted SBC and “public benefit funds.”101 Eighteen states,
plus the District of Columbia, are included through a small
surcharge on electricity bills.102 The funds created a range in
size from less than $1 million to greater than $300 million per
year.103 A number of these states, either explicitly or as a
matter of practice, will fund only sustainable energy projects
within their own states, even though power from all sources in
and outside the state are taxed to create the SBC fund.104
Some states de jure or de facto restrict SBC funds to instate projects.105 Illinois, for example, intends to benefit from
“developing new renewable energy resources and clean coal

99. See 2 INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 33, § 10:114.
100. See Public Benefits Funds, supra note 15.
101. Id. (stating that fifteen states, Washington, D.C., and Puerto Rico
have public benefit funds); see ELIZABETH DORIS ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE
ENERGY LAB., STATE OF THE STATES 2009: RENEWABLE ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF POLICY 65–66 (2009), available at
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46667.pdf.
102. See Public Benefits Funds, supra note 15.
103. See Gary McNeil, State Clean Energy Funds Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/chp/policies/funds_fs.html (last
updated Apr. 2009).
104. See 2 INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 33, § 10:114; Kirsten H.
Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental
Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 295
(1999) (“The electricity burdened by the [system benefits] charge includes both
electricity generated within the state and that imported from out-of-state
sources . . . . As with the renewable portfolio standard a state’s primary
interest lies in supporting its own in-state renewables industry. It is only
rational that the state will use the funds collected through the surcharge to
subsidize in-state industries exclusively.”).
105. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 687/6-2 (2013).
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technologies for use in Illinois”106 and distribute these funds
based on criteria that “promote the goal of fostering investment
in and the development and use, in Illinois, of renewable
energy resources.”107 Illinois has not been challenged; however,
New York utilities, in 2011, challenged New York’s alleged
misuse of system benefit charge funds for non-energy-related
economic development programs.108
C. LEGAL CONCERNS
The constitutional dormant Commerce Clause prohibits
state regulatory actions that are facially discriminatory against
private interstate commerce.109 The dormant Commerce Clause
precedent
is
“driven
by
concern
about
‘economic
protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit
in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors.’”110 State statutes found to discriminate against
out-of-state commerce interests based on geography or favoring
local interests, are found to be per se invalid.111 Discriminatory
statutes are subject to “strict scrutiny,” weighing a compelling
state interest that is the least restrictive means to achieve that
interest.112

106. Id.
107. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 687/6-3(b) (2013) (emphasis added); see also id.
687/6-4(b) (“The Renewable Energy Resources Trust Fund shall be
administered by the Department to provide grants, loans, and other incentives
to foster investment in and the development and use of renewable resources as
provided in Section 6-3 . . . or pursuant to the Illinois Renewable Fuels
Development Program Act.”).
108. Lisa Wood, New York Utilities Challenge Proposal to Use Clean
Energy Funds for Economic Development, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Aug. 1, 2011, at 17
(noting that the utilities charged that the funds must be devoted to utilitybased programs, rather than start-up companies and under-used
technologies).
109. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (citing
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 100 (1994)).
110. Id. at 337–38 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 273–74 (1988)).
111. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 297–98 (1997); Or.
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (noting that if a statute
is facially discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid).
112. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky., 553 U.S. at 338 (“A discriminatory law is
virtually per se invalid . . . and will survive only if it advances a legitimate
local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
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The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the scope of
commerce among the states is broadly defined.113 In-state coal
cannot be required to be used by a state even for the rationale
of satisfying federal Clean Air Act requirements;114 income tax
credits cannot be given by a state only to in-state producers of
fuel additives;115 a state cannot regulate in favor of, or require
the use of, its own in-state energy resources,116 nor can it by
regulation harbor energy-related resources originating in the
state from leaving the state117:
[We] consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution . . . precludes a state from mandating that its residents
be given a preferred right of access, over out‐of‐state consumers, to
natural resources located within its borders or to the products
derived therefrom . . . . [A] State is without power to prevent
privately owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in
interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy
local demands or because they are needed by the people of the
State.118

Electrons in interstate commerce cannot be traced.119 The
Constitution further applies to the sale and transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce120: “[I]t is difficult to
conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than
electric energy, a product used in virtually every home and
every commercial or manufacturing facility. No state relies
solely on its own resources in this respect.”121

nondiscriminatory alternatives.” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
113. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627 (holding that a state cannot
discriminate against articles of commerce originating in other states “unless
there is a reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently” (emphasis
added)).
114. Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 593, 596–97 (7th Cir.
1995).
115. New Energy Co. of Ind., 486 U.S. at 271, 278–80.
116. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–56 (1992); Alliance for
Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
117. New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982).
118. Id. at 338 (internal quotations omitted).
119. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (2002) (discussing Fed.
Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972)).
120. See id.; see also id. at 17 (determining that transmissions on the
interconnected national grids constitute transmissions in interstate
commerce).
121. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982).
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Major states have recently encountered litigation on this
very constitutional issue regarding such state renewable power
regulation allegedly violating the Commerce Clause122:
 A challenge by conventional power generators in New
Jersey to in-state energy facility preferences;123 as well
as similar challenges in Maryland,124 with both held not
122. Cf. Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief at 2, Am. Tradition
Inst. v. Colorado, No. 11-cv-00859 (D. Colo. Apr. 4, 2011) (addressing the
constitutionality of Colorado’s renewable energy standard); Complaint at 1,
TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10-cv-40070 (D. Mass. Apr.
16, 2010) (addressing the constitutionality of Massachusetts’ renewable
energy programs).
123. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 135 FERC ¶ 61,022, order clarified
on reh’g by 137 FERC ¶ 61,145 (2011). In 2011, New Jersey enacted legislation
to encourage the acquisition by utilities of the output of 2000 megawatts of
new in-state power projects. Id. at 61,089. New Jersey faces a pending lawsuit
by several existing independent power generators asserting that the state law
is in violation of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause because it is predicated
on in-state “favoritism.” See Hannah Northey, Energy Markets: Utilities
Challenge N.J. Law While Preparing to Reap Its Benefits, GREENWIRE (Mar. 2,
2011), http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/03/02/4. The New Jersey
act is an explicit effort to promote the construction of new generation facilities
in New Jersey, and the statute allegedly discriminates by ordering utilities to
sign long-term contracts only with in-state generation facilities participating
in multi-state PJM ISO capacity. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 135 FERC
¶ 61,022, ¶ 61,089, order clarified on reh’g by 137 FERC ¶ 61,145 (2011); Mary
Powers, PJM Generators File Complaint with FERC Seeking Relief from NJ
In-State Generation Law, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Feb. 7, 2011, at 11, 13. In
response, the FERC amended the PJM ISO rules to prevent New Jersey state
law from attempting to encourage construction of in-state power generation
by, in part, causing them to bid power into the PJM system at suppressed
prices in order to win capacity right auctions. See Mary Powers, Rebuffed by
FERC Ruling, New Jersey BPU Plans to Look Again at How to Attract New
Generation, ELEC. UTIL. WK., May 23, 2011, at 4, 6, available at
http://www.electricdrive.org/sites/testing/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/
i/22845. FERC, on April 12, 2011, eliminated a PJM rule that allowed a prior
exemption for projects to make minimum offer prices when tempered by state
energy programs. Id. The pending lawsuit in New Jersey asserts that the state
law is in violation of the Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause both
because it is predicated on in-state “favoritism,” and the New Jersey act is a
“blatant and explicit effort to promote the construction of new generation
facilities in New Jersey.” Northey, supra; see also PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v.
Hanna, No. 11-745, 2013 WL 5603896 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2013) (finding a state
pilot project preempted by the Federal Power Act and therefore
unconstitutional in violation of the Supremacy Clause); PPL EnergyPlus, LLC
v. Nazarian, No. MJG-12-1286, 2013 WL 5432346 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2013)
(finding state generation order unconstitutional in violation of the Supremacy
Clause).
124. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, No. MJG-12-1286, 2013 WL
5432346 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2013).
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to violate the Commerce Clause, but both to violate the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution;
 Suit involving renewable power RPS RECs in
Colorado;125
 Suit on Missouri RPS RECs limited to only in-state
projects;126 and
 TransCanada’s
suit
against
Massachusetts
on
discrimination against out-of-state energy projects for
RPS RECs and renewable energy contracts,127 which was
partially settled in favor of the challengers.128
With approximately half of the thirty-eight RPS states
engaging in some sort of in-state favoritism with these state
incentives,129 and each state doing so in an individualized

125. See Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief at 2, Am. Tradition
Inst. v. Colorado, No. 11-cv-00859 (D. Colo. Apr. 4, 2011). American Tradition
Institute’s (ATI) Environmental Law Center filed a lawsuit in federal court
challenging the constitutionality of Colorado’s renewable energy standard,
based upon evidence that the state’s law violates the Commerce Clause. Id. at
2, 5–6. ATI’s complaint argued that because the state mandate provides
economic benefits to Colorado’s renewable electricity generators that are not
available to out-of-state power generators, the program violates the dormant
Commerce Clause. Id. at 16–21.
126. See State ex rel. Mo. Energy Dev. Assoc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo.,
No. 10AC-CC00512, at 14 (Cole Cnty. Ct. June 29, 2011) (holding that the
RPS program “takes the cash property of utilities (and their ratepayers) and
transfers it to certain customers” without due process). The state trial court in
2011 ruled that the Missouri RPS program was illegal because it required
RECs to be generated by in-state projects or projects that delivered the power
to in-state customers. Id. at 11. The decision was reversed on appeal. State ex
rel. Mo. Energy Dev. Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 386 S.W.3d 165 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2012).
127. See Complaint at 1, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No.
4:10-cv-40070 (D. Mass. Apr. 16, 2010). In April 2010, TransCanada sued
Massachusetts, alleging dormant Commerce Clause violations regarding
requirements that state utilities enter long-term contracts with in-state new
renewable energy projects and that solar renewable energy credits be earned
only by in-state solar photovoltaic power projects, regardless of where the
power generation creating the RECs was sold. Id. at 5–19. TransCanada
alleged that Massachusetts’s ratepayers would be negatively impacted
because they would be forced to pay higher rates for only in-state renewable
energy. Id. at 8.
128. Notice of Partial Dismissal of Action and Partial Settlement
Agreement at 1–3, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10-cv40070 (D. Mass. May 2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/
docs/doer/renewables/solar/settlement-agreement.pdf.
129. See supra notes 71–98 and accompanying text.
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manner,130 this foretells a long period of potential individual
legal challenge.
IV. THE THIRD DIMENSION: MERGING
TWO DIMENSIONS
Both the Supremacy Clause of our First Dimension and the
dormant Commerce Clause of our Second Dimension are
combined in Vermont regulations,131 which are now under
serious constitutional challenge regarding energy regulation.132
Similar multi-dimensional constitutional challenges were made
in New Jersey133 and Maryland.134 While these cases do not
concern traditional renewable power, Vermont addresses
nuclear power, which shares a low-carbon profile with
renewable energy sources, and which is bundled with
renewable power in some congressional legislation.135 In this
ongoing dispute, Vermont denied an existing operating power
generation facility from a state permit for continuing operation
unless it sold a substantial portion of its electric output in
wholesale transactions to state utilities at discounted rates to
market prices set in the regional ISO New England (ISO-NE)
wholesale market.136
The outcome of this issue illustrates the costs to citizens
when the state regulates without careful consideration of
constitutional requirements: when the suit was initiated in
2011, Vermont asked the court initially that the plaintiff
energy company should pay the state’s, as well as its own, legal
130. See supra notes 122–28 and accompanying text.
131. See Act 74, 2005 Vt. Acts & Resolves 599; Act 160, 2006 Vt. Acts &
Resolves 204; Act 189, 2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves 478 (requiring affirmative
legislative approval for storage of spent nuclear fuel).
132. See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d
183, 188–90 (D. Vt. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Entergy Nuclear Vt.
Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, No. 12-791-cv (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2013) (holding that
the enactments are preempted by the Atomic Energy Act, making them
constitutionally invalid).
133. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, No. 11-745, 2013 WL 5603896
(D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2013) (finding state regulation unconstitutional).
134. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, No. MJG-12-1286, 2013 WL
5432346 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2013) (finding state regulation unconstitutional).
135. See, e.g., Michael Vickerman, Commentary: Wisconsin Legislature
Weighs Nuclear Option for Renewables, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Mar. 4,
2013),
http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2013/03/04/commentarywisconsin-legislature-weighs-nuclear-option-for-renewables/.
136. See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 236.
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expenses of the litigation.137 The outcome of this case, however,
turned the tables when it was found that the state had taken
an unconstitutional action: it enacted energy regulation that
the federal court found unconstitutional.138 The state was found
responsible for reimbursing the plaintiff’s legal fees, which
were around $5 million at the trial court level and, with appeal,
continuing to mount until later reversed on appeal.139 Similar
requests for attorney fees to plaintiffs who successfully
challenged state energy regulation are now pending in New
Jersey,140 Maryland,141 and California.142
In 2012, the federal district court ruled that this Vermont
regulation of energy violated at once, both of the first
dimension (preemption) and second dimension (dormant
Commerce Clause) constitutional limitations on state energy
regulation.143 Vermont could not discriminate against sale of
power interstate outside of its origin in Vermont.144
This opinion followed the Supreme Court decision in New
England Power Co. v. New Hampshire.145 New England Power
overturned, as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, an
order of the State Public Utilities Commission that restrained
within the state for the financial advantage of in-state
ratepayers, renewable power produced within the state146:
137. Anne Galloway, Shumlin Wants to “Bill Back” Legal Expenses in
Entergy Suit to Entergy, VTDIGGER.ORG (Apr. 30, 2011), http://vtdigger.org/
2011/04/30/shumlin-wants-to-%E2%80%9Cbill-back%E2%80%9D-legalexpenses-in-entergy-suit-to-entergy/.
138. See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 242–43.
139. Id.; Andrew Stein, Entergy May be Closing Vermont Yankee, But
Litigation Goes On, VTDIGGER.ORG (Sept. 10, 2013), http://vtdigger.org/
2013/09/10/entergy-may-be-closing-vermont-yankee-but-litigation-goes-on/; see
Kristin Carlson, Court: Vermont Yankee Can Stay Open, WCAX.COM (Aug. 14,
2013, 9:38 AM), www.wcax.com/story/23134529/appeals-court-rules-forentergy-against-vermont.
140. Motion for Attorney Fees, PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, No. 11-745
(D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2013).
141. Motion for Attorney Fees, PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, No.
MJG-12-1286 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2013).
142. Motion for Attorney Fees, Planning and Conservation League v.
California, No. RG 12626904 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 26, 2013).
143. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 242–43.
144. See id.; see also id. at 236.
145. 455 U.S. 331, 338–39 (1982).
146. Id. at 336, 338–39; see also U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress
shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States . . . .”).
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“[We] consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution . . . precludes a state from mandating that its
residents be given a preferred right of access, over out‐of‐state
consumers, to natural resources located within its borders or to
the products derived therefrom.”147
The Vermont court in 2012 reiterated that “states are
‘without power to prevent privately owned articles of trade
from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the
ground that they are required to satisfy local demands or
because they are needed by the people of the State’ . . . a
‘protectionist regulation’ violating the Commerce Clause.”148
The state also could not regulate or condition any wholesale
power transactions.149 The court stated:
Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq.:
Congress has drawn a bright line between state and
federal authority in the setting of wholesale rates and in
the regulation of agreements that affect wholesale rates.
States may not regulate in areas where FERC has properly
exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and reasonable
wholesale rates or to insure that agreements affecting
wholesale rates are reasonable . . . .
Furthermore, a state, “must . . . give effect to Congress’ desire to
give FERC plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates, and to
ensure that the States do not interfere with this authority.”
Under the “filed-rate doctrine,” state courts and regulatory
agencies are preempted by federal law from requiring the payment
of rates other than the federal filed rate.150

In the Third Dimension, the constitutional issues of both of
the First and Second Dimensions have combined.
V. THE FOURTH DIMENSION: COPPER AND
FIRST REFUSAL
There are other dimensions. Here we focus on several
states that have regulated whether out-of-state companies that
would want to construct electric transmission facilities are

147. New Eng. Power Co., 455 U.S. at 338 (citations omitted) (quoting
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928)).
148. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (quoting New
England Power, 455 U.S. at 338–39).
149. Id. at 233.
150. Id. at 233–34 (citations omitted).
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barred in favor of in-state companies.151 This type of regulation
raises constitutional issues.152 There is a potential conflict
between federal jurisdiction and the in-state transmission
decisions of some states on the issue of who builds the means to
transmit power.153 To date, electric power requires a
transmission network to be usable.154
A.

IN THE ELECTRIC FIELD

Electrons, which are energy, are never consumed; their
velocity and force of movement is diminished as electricity is
used. Their movement creates an electro-magnetic field, which
is a mechanism to transfer energy from the point of original
movement along a conductive wire to a distant place on the
transmission network. In key ways, the movement of electricity
is not delivering a commodity, but allowing others to realize
benefits from the velocity and force of the movement itself.155
We do not “consume” electrons, but rather we consume work
created by their movement.156 Electric circuits are a means for
conveying current energy from one place to another.157 Current
is the rate of flow of electric charge from one region to another
in a circuit.158 Because the motions of the electrons are random,
there is no net flow of charge in any direction inside the copper
wire.159
151. Cf. RISHI GARG, NAT’L REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., WHAT’S BEST
FOR THE STATES: A FEDERALLY IMPOSED COMPETITIVE SOLICITATION MODEL
OR A PREFERENCE FOR THE INCUMBENT? STATE ADOPTION OF RIGHT OF FIRST
REFUSAL STATUTES IN RESPONSE TO FERC ORDER 1000 AND THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE, at iv (2013), available at http://communities.nrri.org/

documents/317330/d852a44f-0e5e-48d5-8aaa-2e09f167c24a (analyzing rightof-first-refusal statutes enacted in Minnesota, North Dakota, and South
Dakota, and proposed in New Mexico and Oklahoma).
152. See id. (analyzing whether the right-of-first-refusal statutes are
constitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause).
153. See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2002).
154. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission
Owning & Operating Pub. Utils., 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, ¶ 116 (2011) (stating
that transmission networks improve the delivery of electricity).
155. See Steven Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired Universe:
Thermodynamics, Mass, and Energy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1839, 1863–64
(2004).
156. See id.
157. HUGH D. YOUNG & ROGER A. FREEDMAN, UNIVERSITY PHYSICS 799
(9th ed. 1996).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 800.
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All this changes when an electric field is applied to the
copper wire.160 There is a very slow motion of the moving
charges in the direction of the force of the electric field, which
is resultant flow of moving charges is a current in a wire.161 For
a conductor to have a steady current, it must be part of a path
that forms a closed loop.162 The influence that makes current
flow from lower potential to a higher potential is called
electromotive force163 and is measured as a volt or a
joule/coulomb.164 The charge moves around the circuit at
varying levels of potential energy.165
Some will argue that the electric company is selling its
customers electrons. In a direct current circuit, the charges
move the whole length of the circuit.166 In theory then, if an
electric company used direct current, electrons from the copper
coil turned by the turbine would eventually make their way
into our homes. But the customer does not consume these
electrons; only the energy they are carrying is consumed by the
end user.167 Furthermore, for every electron that a customer
receives from the electric company, the electric company
receives an electron from the customer; the charge is never
consumed nor created.168 The charges are all there in the
beginning and at the end.169
Electricity is transmitted, however, via alternating
current.170 Because the current is constantly changing
direction, the electrons do not flow around the circuit, but
oscillate in a confined area, delivering energy in the form of an
energized electric field.171 Electricity is neither tangible nor

160. See id. at 804, 809.
161. See id. at 808.
162. Id. at 809.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 165 (stating that a joule is a unit of energy); id. at 675
(stating that coulomb is a unit of charge).
165. See id. at 809.
166. See id.
167. Ferrey, supra note 155, at 1863–64.
168. Id. at 1910–14.
169. See 2 INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 33, § 2:1, at 2–4, § 2:1.1, at 2–
8; THE NEW RULES, supra note 33, at 211–32.
170. See YOUNG & FREEDMAN, supra note 155, at 850.
171. See, e.g., Craig T. Liljestrand, EMFs and the Potential for Injury: Real
Danger or Overreaction?, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 400, 400–401 (1995).
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movable.172 The courts have determined that electrons in
interstate commerce cannot be traced.173 Notwithstanding, the
FERC has held seven times that electricity is a tangible good
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.174
B. RIGHTS OF FIRST REFUSAL
Can states require that additional transmission facilities
be built by incumbent in-state businesses? Recall that
transmission really is everything: it is not the copper molecule
electrons, but the movement of these electrons, that creates
and delivers electric power.175 Therefore, speaking of the
physical reality rather than the legal fiction, transmission is
everything. Copper is everything.
The FERC has attempted to regulate who builds new
transmission capacity.176 The FERC exclusively regulates
transmission transactions and tariffs.177 FERC Order 1000
requires incumbent transmission providers, utilities, to remove
rights-of-first-refusal (ROFR) from FERC-approved tariffs.178
And all transmission tariffs are exclusively within FERC,
rather than state, jurisdiction.179 The FERC does not regulate
the construction of transmission facilities themselves, only
economic tariffs for their transactions.180 Failure to consider
and evaluate nonincumbent projects could violate the FERC

172. Ferrey, supra note 155, at 1864.
173. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (2002) (discussing Fed.
Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972)).
174. Ferrey, supra note 155, at 1891.
175. Id. at 1910–12.
176. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission
Owning & Operating Pub. Utils. (Order 1000), 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, ¶¶ 253–
254, 258 (2011).
177. Ferrey, supra note 155, at 1889.
178. Transmission Planning, 136 FERC, ¶ 7. For an excellent treatment of
this, see generally GARG, supra note 151 (summarizing and analyzing the
impact of FERC Order 1000).
179. See Transmission Planning, 136 FERC, ¶ 287.
180. See id. This pertains only to Commission-jurisdictional tariffs or
agreements and does not require removal of references to such state or local
laws or regulations from Commission-approved tariffs or agreements. See id.
¶ 253 n.231. The FERC noted that Order 1000 does not address the prudence
of investment decisions nor determine which particular entity should
construct any particular transmission facility, but merely to allow more
entities to be considered for potential construction responsibility. Id. ¶ 290.
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Order 890 planning principle of “openness” in transmission
planning.181
Nonetheless, some states have enacted ROFR statutes: for
example, three states have enacted these,182 and a few other
states have proposed them.183 Minnesota has enacted an ROFR
statute that confers upon the incumbent “the right to construct,
own, and maintain an electric transmission line that has been
approved for construction in a federally registered planning
authority transmission plan and connects to facilities owned by
that incumbent electric transmission owner.”184 South Dakota
created an ROFR, which confers to the incumbent “[t]he right
to construct, own, and maintain an electric transmission line
that connects to facilities owned by [the incumbent utility
grid].”185 North Dakota conferred an ROFR to the incumbent
transmission provider under a certificate of public convenience
and necessity, which cannot be issued to another if the existing
public utility is willing and able to construct and operate a
similar electric transmission line.186
Other states have proposed statutes as well.187 Except for
North Dakota, each state’s actual or proposed statute confers
upon an in-state incumbent transmission company the right to
construct a facility identified and approved for construction in a
federally approved FERC plan, at the expense of a potential
competitor, contrary to the FERC’s order.188 And this
regulatory issue raises both of the previously discussed
constitutional issues.189 First, there is a Supremacy Clause
issue lurking in states adopting ROFR despite federal FERC
prohibition of such provisions, when the FERC has exclusive

181. See id. ¶ 229.
182. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 216B.246 (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-03-01
(2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-32-19 (2011); GARG, supra note 151, at
10–13.
183. E.g., S. 175, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2013); see also GARG, supra
note 151, at 11–13 (describing several states’ proposed ROFR bills).
184. MINN. STAT. § 216B.246, subdiv. 2 (2012).
185. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-32-20 (2011).
186. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-03-01 (2011).
187. See, e.g., S. 175, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2013) (articulating New
Mexico’s proposed ROFR language).
188. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-03-01 (2011), with MINN. STAT.
§ 216B.246 (2012), and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-32-19 (2011).
189. GARG, supra note 151, at iv.
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authority to oversee such transactions.190 Second, there is a
dormant Commerce Clause issue when states favor in-state
incumbent providers of electric transmission service in lieu of
other or out-of-state providers.191 This is potentially a
constitutional issue, in addition to being contrary to a federal
order issued pursuant to the FERC’s federal authority.192
VI. THE FIFTH DIMENSION: BEYOND POWER
TO CLIMATE
A. STATE CARBON CONTROL REGULATION
In the absence of federal climate change legislation in the
United States, nine states (at one time ten states after
Massachusetts later joined, and now reduced to nine
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states after New Jersey
withdrew193) have combined into the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI) to regulate only CO2 from their larger power
plants.194 The RGGI states, as well as California,195 identified
ways to arrest so-called “leakage” into the state of less-costly

190. See id. at 17–18.
191. See id. at 13–17.
192. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 797(g) (2012) (granting authority to
the FERC to issue orders in the interest of the public).
193. See Welcome, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (noting that the nine states include Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
Rhode Island, and Vermont).
194. Id; see DAVID FARNSWORTH ET AL., REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS
INITIATIVE, POTENTIAL EMISSIONS LEAKAGE AND THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE
GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI): EVALUATING MARKET DYNAMICS, MONITORING
OPTIONS, AND POSSIBLE MITIGATION MECHANISMS, at ES-1 (2007), available
at http://www.rggi.org/docs/il_report_final_3_14_07.pdf. Seven states signed
the RGGI Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) originally and a few others
later on; however, New Jersey recently withdrew, see Mireya Navarro,
Christie Pulls New Jersey from 10-State Climate Initiative, N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/nyregion/christie-pulls-nj-fromgreenhouse-gas-coalition.html?_r=0, and other states have considered
withdrawal from this cap-and-trade program. Amy Quinton, Three States
Consider Withdrawal from RGGI, NEWBIOMASSNH (Apr. 7, 2011),
http://www.newbiomassnh.org/three-states-consider-withdrawal-from-rggi.
195. CAP & TRADE SUBGROUP, CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, CAP AND TRADE
PROGRAM DESIGN OPTIONS: FINAL REPORT 34–35 (2006), available at
http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/reports/2006report/200
6-03-27_CAP_AND_TRADE.PDF.
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power whose carbon content is not regulated or affected.196 The
RGGI Staff Working Group investigated whether a substantial
proportion of CO2 emissions avoided by the RGGI could be offset
and lost by corresponding increases of cheaper fossil fuel
electric generation in non-RGGI states, 197 with early
modeling under a “middle-of-the-road” scenario estimating
leakage of CO2 at 27% depending on the programmatic
assumptions,198 though earlier modeling and a “high” scenario
placed the leakage percentage higher.199 The governors in
affected states agreed to “pursue technically sound measures to
prevent leakage from undermining the integrity of the
Program.”200 Because states do not want the greenhouse gas
(GHG) carbon costs that they impose on their in-state power
generators, which are then passed on to those utilities’ in-state
consumers, to lead to higher-carbon out-of-state power imports
of cheaper fossil-fueled power, they considered securing
borders, or at least a power import surcharge to dissuade
intruding power flows.201
“Leakage” is not some kind of physical breach of power
engineering.202 Rather, it is the mere consumer or buyer
preference for lower-priced commodities and services, even if
they originate from outside the state.203 California imports
power from eleven states, including a large amount of coal-fired
power, and California’s choice to regulate carbon at the point of
generation is necessary for California to get at the problem of

196. See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 194, at ES-1. RGGI States such
as New Jersey, New York, Maryland, and Delaware are bordered by states
that are not signatories to the RGGI and do historically produce a large
volume of electricity from coal-fueled power plants. See id. at ES-1, 9.
Similarly, California imports power from eleven states, including a large
amount of coal-fired power. See CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2006 NET SYSTEM
POWER REPORT 1 (2007), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/
2007publications/CEC-300-2007-007/CEC-300-2007-007.PDF.
197. See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 194, at ES-1 to ES-2.
198. Id. at 9.
199. The Author has observed that RGGI has removed earlier modeling
estimates projecting a higher leakage percentage from its website.
200. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING 10 (2005), available at www.rggi.org/design/history/mou.
201. See id. The governors in affected states agreed to “pursue technically
sound measures to prevent leakage from undermining the integrity of the
program.” Id.
202. See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 194, at ES-1.
203. Id.
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high-carbon power leakage into the state.204 Wholesale
electricity is moving constantly in interstate commerce at the
speed of light.205 Leakage barriers typically attempt to arrest
electricity in interstate commerce under normal market
conditions.206
In a suit against the State of New York’s RGGI program in
2009, New York’s quick settlement had Consolidated Edison
Company agreeing to pay the plaintiff cogeneration project for
the cost of its additional carbon allowances through the end of
their preexisting long-term contracts.207 New York’s
participation in the RGGI was challenged a second time in
2011 as being without proper legislative approval and only
implemented by regulation.208
California has begun comprehensive regulation of all
GHGs from all sources.209 The California carbon scheme
requires that California reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels
by 2020, considering all in-state and out-of-state generation
used to serve California’s electric load.210 California and other
carbon-regulating states, however, must avoid regulating in a
way that impermissibly burdens interstate commerce in
electricity. Such burdens are not required to be direct
prohibitions of power imports.

204. See CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, supra note 196, at 1; see also HARVARD
ELEC. POLICY GRP., FORTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION, RAPPORTEUR’S
SUMMARY
39
(2007),
available
at
www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/
RapporteurReport12-07.pdf.
205. See 1 INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 140, § 2:1; Ferrey, supra note
155, at 1889.
206. Cf. FARNSWORTH ET AL. supra note 194, at 42–43 (describing the
potential impact of leakage barriers on electric system reliability).
207. See Press Release, Peter A. Barden, Indeck Energy Sues State
Questioning Legality of Regional Greenhouse Gas Program (Jan. 29, 2009),
available
at
http://www.indeckenergy.com/pdfnews/RGGI%20Lawsuit%
20012909%20.pdf; Vicki Shiah, Settlement Reached in Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative Lawsuit, SPR ENVTL. L. BLOG (Jan. 14, 2010, 2:28 PM),
http://blog.sprlaw.com/2010/01/settlement-reached-in-regional-greenhousegas-initiative-lawsuit/.
208. Geoffrey Craig & Gail Roberts, Lawsuit Disputes Legality of New York
Participation in RGGI, Citing Lack of Legislative Approval, ELEC. UTIL. WK.,
July 4, 2011, at 10.
209. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West 1996).
210. Assemb. B. 32, Ch. 488, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006). The bill sets
a firm limit on GHG emissions in California by requiring the Air Resources
Board to determine California’s GHG emission level in 1990 and then issue
regulations causing GHG emissions to be reduced to that level by 2020. Id.
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B. BEYOND ELECTRICITY: CLEAN FUELS
As part of its GHG regulation, California regulated clean
fuel, factoring in the determination of the credit value and
discrimination regarding out-of-state fuels based on the
distance the fuel must travel (using fossil fuels for
transportation) to reach California markets, as well as the
extent to which coal and other fossil fuels are used to produce
electricity.211 A.B. 32, the California Global Warming Solutions
Act of 2006, requires the California Air Resources Board
(CARB) to develop a comprehensive plan to reduce GHG
emissions in the state to its historic 1990 levels by the year
2020.212 As part of this, the purpose of the low carbon fuel
standard (LCFS) is “to implement a low carbon fuel standard,
which will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by reducing the
full fuel-cycle, carbon intensity of the transportation fuel pool
used in California . . . .”213 It requires providers of gasoline and
diesel fuels to calculate the carbon intensity (CI) of each fuel
component, report such calculations to CARB, and make
reductions in order to meet the carbon intensity standards.214
The greater carbon-emission-intensity of electricity produced in
the Midwest used to create these cleaner fuels devalued out-ofstate cleaner fuels in the California regulation.215
A California federal trial court held that a state violates
the dormant Commerce Clause if it discriminates against out-

211. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071,
1080 (E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730
F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
212. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38,500–38,599 (West 2012).
213. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480 (2013).
214. Id.
215. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1086–87. The
court reiterated that only the federal government can regulate commerce
between the states, and California, attempting to regulate commerce outside
its borders, violates exclusive federal authority to regulate interstate
commerce. Id. at 1094. California gave less value to the identical energy fuel,
ethanol, when produced in the Midwest because of the latter region’s use of
coal-fired power for electricity used to produce ethanol and other products and
the longer transportation distance for trucks to transport ethanol from there
to California. See id. at 1086–87. While such discrimination did reflect the
total embedded energy emissions and transportation costs of different means
to produce the energy products and to move them to market from
geographically distant production sources, the court held that states cannot
elect to discriminate against more distant, out-of-state products. Id. at 1088–
89.
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of-state energy products based on the distance it must travel
from out of state and the greater carbon-intensity of electricity
used at the source of the production to produce the renewable
fuel.216 The court reiterated that only the federal government
can regulate commerce between the states, and California, in
attempting to regulate commerce outside its borders, violated
exclusive federal authority to regulate interstate commerce.217
The court again distinguished motive from constitutional
requirements, holding, “[a]lthough [the state’s] goal to combat
global warming may be ‘legitimate,’ . . . it cannot ‘be achieved
by the illegitimate means of isolating the State from the
national economy.’”218
The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the decision, holding
that the regulations were not facially discriminatory, the
transportation and electricity source factors used in the
regulations were permissible under the general ability of states
to act as laboratories for experimentation, and that the
regulations did not exceed California’s authority under the
dormant Commerce Clause.219 The dissenting opinion in the
Ninth Circuit decision found there was facial discrimination.220
Of four federal judges who ruled on this case at the trial and
appellate levels, two found it unconstitutional, while two did
not.221 At the time of this writing, a motion for rehearing en
banc was pending,222 with a motion for a writ of certiorari to
follow next.

216. Id. at 1088.
217. Id. at 1094.
218. Id. at 1088–89 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 626 (1978)).
219. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2013).
220. Id. at 1108 (Murgia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
221. Judge O’Neill for the Eastern District of California and Judge Murgia
for the Ninth Circuit found the regulations unconstitutional, while Judges
Gould and Nelson for the Ninth Circuit did not. Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union, 730 F.3d 1070; Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071.
222. See Keith Goldberg, 9th Circuit Urged to Rethink Calif. Carbon Fuel
Standard, LAW360 (Oct. 3, 2013, 5:16 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/477847/9th-circ-urged-to-rethink-calif-carbon-fuel-standard.
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C. CLIMATE IS INTERNATIONAL
To the extent unparalleled by any other emissions, climate
control is international.223 GHGs emitted in any U.S. state, or
anywhere in the world, exert similar warming of the planet.224
There were GHG reduction-funding pledges made by developed
countries, including the United States (even though it has not
ratified the Kyoto Protocol) over a period of years at the annual
Conference of Parties (CoP)225:
 At CoP-3 forming the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which now
has 192 parties;226
 At the 2007 Bali Conference of the Parties (CoP-13);227
 At the 2009 Copenhagen CoP-15;228

223. See Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited
Oct. 10, 2013) (“The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change . . . .”).
224. See id.
225. See id.; Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/
kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Oct. 10,
2013).
226. See A Brief History of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, EARTH
NEGOTIATIONS BULL. (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., New York, N.Y.) Dec.
11, 2012, at 2 available at www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12567e.pdf. The socalled Annex 1 countries agreed to reduce GHGs by an average of 5% below
country 1990 levels between 2008–2012, with amounts varying by country. Id.
The Protocol achieved ratification by enough signatories to come into force
February 16, 2005. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 223.
227. A Brief History of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, supra note
226, at 2. CoP is the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, an
annual meeting to attempt to implement the goals of the Protocol. See United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties,
Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–15, 2007, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 3 (Mar. 14,
2008),
available
at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/
06a01.pdf#page=3; Jessica Aldred, Q&A: Bali Climate Change Conference,
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2007, 12:05 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2007/nov/30/bali.climatechange; Deal Agreed in Bali Climate
Talks, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2007, 7:33 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2007/dec/15/bali.climatechange4.
228. See COP 16: UN Conference Delegates Debate Source of Climate
Change Funds, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/
12/08/cop-16-un-conference-dele_n_794094.html (last updated May 25, 2011,
7:15 PM). The Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (CoP-15), which took
place in December 2009, was intended to establish an ambitious global climate
change agreement for the post-2012 period, when the Kyoto Protocol expires.
See Summary: Copenhagen Climate Summit, CENTER FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONS,
http://www.c2es.org/international/negotiations/cop-15/summary
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 At the 2010 Cancún CoP-16 with agreement on the
“Cancún Agreements” to try to limit GHG emissions to
hold temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius229 and
establishing a new Green Climate Fund and standing
committees and a fast-start pledge;230
 At the 2011 Durban CoP-17, which reached some
advance on the Green Climate Fund;231 and
 At the 2012 Doha CoP-18, which needed to adopt a
second commitment period.232
At the 2012 Doha CoP-18, and at the Copenhagen CoP-15,
there was a $30 billion financing commitment of developed
countries to finance developing country GHG emission
mitigation and adaption efforts by 2012 and a $100 billion
annual commitment by 2020.233
VII. CONCLUSION
The solicitation notice for the conference foursquare set the
stage for this conference:
First, we do not have the legal, institutional, or physical
infrastructure to transition to cleaner energy sources . . . we do not
have effective governance strategies for complex, multi-level
problems that predominate at the intersection of environmental and
energy law . . . .
....
....
Many of our most daunting environmental and energy
challenges cross jurisdictional boundaries, involve multiple levels of
governance (e.g., local, state, regional, national, international), or
both. Natural systems do not respect the artificial territorial and
jurisdictional boundaries of governments, whether at the local, state,
or national levels . . . . With no single institution well-positioned to

(last visited Oct. 26, 2013). The Conference only produced a thirteenparagraph “political accord,” which was not an official product of the meeting
and was only “noted” by the Conference because of lack of a consensus among
world nations. See id. This comprises the regulatory fabric insulating the
world against global warming.
229. A Brief History of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, supra note
226, at 2.
230. See id. A Standing Committee was created to attempt to deal with the
funding mechanism. Id.
231. See id.
232. Id. at 3. Issues were raised as to whether the commitments in the Bali
Action Plan had been met. Id.
233. Id. at 2.
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solve the problem, it may simply fall between the cracks; or it may be
addressed partially and inadequately by one or more well-intentioned
institutional actors . . . .234

Let me underscore several statements in this preamble to
the conference:
 The shortcoming is appropriate legal and regulatory
structure, even more than physical infrastructure.
 States have strategies, but they are not effective
strategies when they do not mesh with the requirements
of the Constitution and the Federal Power Act noted in
the First Dimension.
 Power seldom stops at state boundaries. State policies
that distinguish between the geographic origin of
commerce in power are at risk in the Second Dimension,
if challenged.
 Some of the state regulation of power enters the Third
Dimension, invoking several constitutional trip-wires.
 When we look at hardware and other fuels, there are
still other dimensions.
There is a substantial need for sustainable electric power
development. It is the key infrastructure that will determine
the future carbon footprint. And the current sustainable energy
policy is largely implemented at the state, rather than federal,
level of government. Many of these state policies are
confronting Supremacy and dormant Commerce Clause
constitutional challenges. It is not that we lack energy
infrastructure; rather, we lack legally smart implementation of
energy infrastructure. It is enough to note that the challenges
are several, raise significant legal issues, and are ongoing.
In fairness, constitutional infrastructure and governance
are not the only challenges to renewable energy projects. A
number of renewable energy projects have been the subject of
individual litigation challenge over the past decade, as opposed
to challenge to an entire state regulatory program supporting
certain incentives for renewable energy. One study tracked
sixty challenges to thirty-four projects involving solar, wind,
biomass, geothermal, and other areas of renewable energy.235
234. Conference Themes, supra note 1.
235. See Janice Schneider & Taiga Takahashi, A Snapshot of Renewable
Energy Project Litigation, LAW360 (Dec. 6, 2012, 10:23 AM),
http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/snapshot-renewable-energy-projectlitigation.
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Roughly half were still in litigation, eight were settled, and
eight ended in a court decision.236 These challenges involved
the National Environmental Policy Act and its state analogue
statutes, the National Historic Preservation Act, the
Endangered Species Act, and various land-use laws.237 Three of
the eighteen completed suits resulted in the projects being
cancelled or withdrawn.238
Regardless of legal challenges, renewable energy is a
critical part of the energy future.239 Renewables are virtually
inexhaustible.240 Energy used by humankind on the earth
equals only about 0.01% of the total solar energy reaching the
earth.241 Solar energy provides as much potential energy to the
entire globe every seventy minutes as humankind uses in the
entirety of each year,242 In fact, no nation on earth uses more
energy than the energy content contained in the sunlight that
strikes its existing buildings every day.243 The solar energy
that falls on roads in the United States each year contains
roughly as much energy content as all the fossil fuel consumed
in the world during that same year.244 Wind power’s global
energy potential is thirty-five times world electricity use.245
Exactly a month before this Minnesota conference, the
Washington Post carried a story under the caption: “The
Biggest Fight over Renewable Energy is Now in the States.”246
This statement is an accurate assessment of where the battle
is—in five dimensions—in current real time.

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. (including the Makah Bay Wave Energy Project, the Goshen South
Wind Project, and the Pahnamid Wind Project).
239. STEVEN FERREY WITH ANIL CABRAAL, RENEWABLE POWER IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: WINNING THE WAR ON GLOBAL WARMING 35 (2006)
(“Energy is the single most important problem facing humanity today.”
(quoting Richard Smalley, Nobel Laureate, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 26, 2002, at
1)).
240. See id.
241. Id. at 36.
242. AMORY B. LOVINS, IMRAN SHEIKH & ALEX MARKEVICH, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN
INST.,
FORGET
NUCLEAR
6
(2008),
available
at
http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/E08-04_ForgetNuclear.
243. FERREY WITH CABRAAL, supra note 239, at 36.
244. Id.
245. LOVINS, SHEIKH & MARKEVICH, supra note 242, at 6.
246. See Plumer, supra note 61.
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